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The Use of Armed Force in International
Affairs: Self-Defense and the Panama
Invasion
RUTH WEDGWOOD*
Self-defense is the most prominent rationale for the U.S. invasion
of Panama. President Bush informed the Congress on December 21,
1989 that the "deployment of U.S. Forces is an exercise of the right of
self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations charter
and was necessary to protect American lives in imminent danger."!
The strength of the President's claim depends upon the facts.
Upon close inspection, the factual record of events preceding the inva-
sion discloses two keen surprises. The problem of violence faced by
American armed services personnel and civilians in Panama was long-
standing and more serious than was generally reported in the press.
Thus, the task of crafting an appropriate American response was not
easy. Yet, it is not clear that the United States fully exercised a
number of available measures short of armed invasion to protect
Americans from the problems of low-level violence. This passivity
undermines any legal justification for the invasion based upon self-
defense.
I. ARGUMENTS FOR SELF-DEFENSE
There are six key parts in the argument for self-defense. The
reader should be aware that this is a reconstructed argument; the
United States did not have occasion after the overthrow of the
Noriega regime to fully muster the factual arguments for self-defense.
* Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Chair, Committee on International
Arms Control and Security Affairs, Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The
author travelled to Panama in the summer of 1990, under funding from Yale University and
the Ford Foundation, in connection with the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
to interview participants in the Panama invasion. This article expresses solely the views of the
author.
1. Letter from President Bush to House Speaker Thomas Foley (Dec. 21, 1989),
reprinted in H.R. DOC. No. 127, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
LETIER].
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A. No Safe Haven for Americans
The Canal Zone was returned to Panamanian jurisdiction in
1979 when the Panama Canal Treaty came into force.2 As a result,
the United States lost any convenient "safe haven" to which Ameri-
cans in Panama could retreat. Many members of the Panamanian
Defense Forces (pDF)3 and officials of the Noriega government took
up residence in the former Canal Zone. There were still some special
areas set aside for Panama Canal Commission employees and Ameri-
can military personnel and their dependents, but many Americans-
including thousands of American corporate employees-lived in dis-
persed housing arrangements in neighborhoods throughout Panama
City and the Republic. The intermingling of the American and Pana-
manian communities meant that United States citizens were exposed
to the actions of the Noriega government. The United States could
not easily limit this exposure. American military base areas are rela-
tively small, making it difficult to house all American military depen-
dents and employees of the Panama Canal Commission, and virtually
impossible to house on any continuing basis the thousands of other
American civilians working or retired in Panama. Even on some mili-
2. Panama Canal Treaty, United States-Panama, 193 Stat. 4521, 33 U.S.T. 39, T.I.A.S.
No. 10030 (signed Sept. 7, 1977; entered into force Oct. 1, 1979). The Panama Canal Treaty
recognizes Panamanian sovereignty over the former Canal Zone, but allows the Panama Canal
Commission, a U.S. government corporation, to continue operating the Canal itself until the
year 2000, subject to requirements of paying at least $10 million annually to Panama in toll
revenues, increasing Panamanian employment in operating the Canal, and having a Panama-
nian Administrator for the Canal Commission as of January 1, 1990. See Panama Canal
Treaty, supra, arts. 1(3), 3(3)(c), 13(4). Until the year 2000 the United States has "primary
responsibility to protect and defend the Canal." United States rights "to station, train and
move military forces within the Republic of Panama" and its "use of areas and installations
and the legal status of [U.S.] armed forces" are governed by an implementing agreement. See
Panama Canal Treaty, supra, art. 4(2); Agreement Between the United States and Panama on
Implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty [hereinafter Article IV Implement-
ing Agreement], 33 U.S.T. 307, T.I.A.S. No. 10032 (signed Sept. 7, 1977; entered into force
Oct. 1, 1979). The Panama Canal Treaty terminates on Dec. 31, 1999 with turnover of the
Canal to Panamanian jurisdiction.
In the year 2000 and after, the new legal regime of a Permanent Neutrality Treaty will
govern the Canal. The Canal is to be a neutral international waterway operated by Panama,
and as of that date only Panama may "maintain military forces, defense sites and military
installations within its national territory." The United States retains the right to "defend the
Canal against any aggression or threat against the peaceful transit of vessels through the
Canal." Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal,
United States-Panama, arts. 1, 4, & 5, 33 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 10029 (signed Sept. 7, 1977;
entered into force Oct. 1, 1979).
3. The Panamanian Defense Forces (pDF) combined the functions of the police and
military. All its divisions were commanded by Noriega. See FUERZAS DE DEFENSA [ARMED
FORCES OF PANAMA] (1987 handbook published by PDF and Sipimex Ltda., Santi;lgo, Chile).
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tary bases there is no complete physical insulation between American
and Panamanian forces.4
The 1977 Canal Treaty abolished any "extraterritoriality" for
Americans in Panama. Before the 1977 Treaty, Americans in the
Canal Zone were under the police jurisdiction of American authori-
ties. This ended with the return of the Canal Zone to Panama. In the
Panama Canal Treaty, the United States recognized the Republic of
Panama as "territorial sovereign" of all land in Panama, including the
former Canal Zone, and did not restrict by treaty the ordinary crimi-
nal and civil jurisdiction of the Panamanian government over foreign
citizens living in Panama.5 American corporate employees, off-duty
American soldiers, American military dependents, and Canal Com-
mission employees could be stopped by the PDF for civil or criminal
infractions, including traffic violations.6 Hence, there was no easy
way to shield Americans from the actions of the Panamanian
authorities.
B. Abuse of Off-Duty American Soldiers and Civilians
From 1987 until the invasion-although it received limited pub-
licity in the United States-Noriega encouraged incidents involving
abuse of American soldiers as a way to rally support for his leader-
ship. Harassment of off-duty American soldiers by local Panamanian
4. For example, the United States Southern Command and the Panamanian Defense
Forces Fifth Battalion housed troops at Fort Amador, the major military facility adjacent to
downtown Panama City; only a parade green separated the barracks of the PDF from the
family housing of U.S. military dependents. At Fort Gulick, near Colon, family housing for
U.S. military dependents remained on the facility after the base was turned over to the PDF.
5. Panama Canal Treaty, supra note 2, arts. I & 3.
6. Police elements of the PDF included the Fuerza de Policia, the "DENI" (Departa-
mento Nacional de Investigaciones), and "DNTT" (Direccion Nacional de Transito Ter-
restre). See FUERZAS DE DEFENSA, supra note 3.
The implementing agreements under the 1977 Treaties gave Panama the right to exercise
primary criminal jurisdiction over ordinary crimes committed by American soldiers, Canal
Commission employees, and their dependents-though, for these classes of defendants, Pan-
ama promised in the agreements to give "sympathetic consideration" to requests for ceding
jurisdiction. Arrests could be carried out by Panamanian police. American authorities were
to be notified "as promptly as possible" of any such arrest and, for other than serious crimes,
defendants were to be "handed over" on request to American authorities for pretrial custody.
The United States had a "primary right" to exercise criminal jurisdiction over offenses com-
mitted within defense sites, committed in the course of official duties, committed against
United States property or security, or committed against United States service members or
civilian employees. See Article IV Implementing Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6 (criminal
jurisdiction over service members and dependents); Agreement Between the United States and
Panama on Implementation of Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty [hereinafter Article III
Implementing Agreement], 33 U.S.T. 141, T.I.A.S. No. 10031, art. 19 (criminal jurisdiction
over U.S. citizen employees of Canal Commission and dependents) (signed Sept. 7, 1977;
entered into force Oct. 1, 1979).
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officers had always been an occasional event against the background
of Panamanian nationalism. These incidents of harassment increased
in number and seriousness after the United States imposed economic
sanctions. The United States Southern Command, the military com-
mand in charge of all American armed service personnel in Panama,
received continuing reports of the mistreatment of American soldiers
taken into custody by the PDF for minor infractions or for no reason
at alP
Among the reported incidents most unnerving to the American
community in Panama over the two year period preceding the inva-
sion were: the alleged beating of a U.S. soldier and the rape and beat-
ing of his wife by a male dressed in military fatigues;8 the firing of a
gun towards the head of a Navy petty officer during a police traffic
stop, when the Navy officer resisted the attempted theft of his watch
and ring;9 and the detention oflocal school buses carrying 100 Ameri-
can school children by PDF soldiers-including an attempt to tow
away a bus while the children were still aboard-following the bus
operators' failure to obtain tax clearance certificates.1o Other dis-
turbing reports included the 24-hour detention of a U.S. serviceman
and his father by four PDF officers who beat the father, pointed guns
at the heads of the father and son, and robbed them of $300;11 the
7. These incidents were widely discussed in the American community in Panama, but
received only limited press coverage in the United States. Most American newspapers did not
have a reporter resident in Panama. Toward the end, there was heated debate whether the
Department ofDefense was seeking to minimize the incidents in order to prevent further dete-
rioration of United States-Panama relations, or whether officials of the Department of State
were magnifying incidents in advocacy of the use of force. See Terror in Panama: Violence
Against Americans on Rise; u.s. Response Hit, Army Times, Mar. 20, 1989, at A3 (reporting
criticism by former Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams of Defense Department
response to incidents). Some of the incidents were described in Congressional hearings in
Apri11989. See "Fact Sheet (23 Feb 89), Summary ofmost serious PDF-US Forces Personnel
Harassment Incidents ... from 6 Feb 88 to 23 Feb 89," Supplement to the Testimony of Lt.
Gen. Donald W. Jones, Dep. Ass't Sec. of Defense for Military Manpower and Personnel
Policy, in Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990-H.R. 2461,
Before the Readiness Subcomm. of the House Committee on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1502-11 (Apr. 12, 1989 session "To Review Military Quality of Life") [hereinafter DOD
Summary].
8. DOD Summary, supra note 7 (incident of June 16, 1988). See also Sciolino, Anti-U.S.
Attacks Spread in Panama, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1988, at All, col. 1; Sciolino, U.S. Says
Panama is Harassing G.L~, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1988, at A16, col. 1.
9. DOD Summary, supra note 7 (incident of Nov. 13, 1988).
10. PDF Illegally Detains School Buses, Tropic Times (newspaper of the U.S. Southern
Command, Panama) [hereinafter Tropic Times], Mar. 6, 1989, at 1, col. 1. The bus operators'
failure to obtain tax clearance certificates was offered as an excuse for the attempt to tow away
a bus while the children were stiII aboard. Tropic Times, Mar. 23, 1989, at 1, col. 3 (descrip-
tion of incident by Rep. WiIIiam Lehman of Florida, at hearing of House Committee on
Appropriations).
11. DOD Summary, supra note 7 (incident of Aug. 1, 1988).
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sexual abuse of an Air Force enlisted woman by two PDF officers;12
and the severe beatihg of a United States Navy civilian employee who
was reporting to a police station of the Panamanian National Investi-
gation Department (DEN!) in Colon.13 Though some incidents
involved intoxicated police officers and the extortion of sums of
money, other incidents showed a clear desire to taunt and intimi-
date.14 Civilians as well as military personnel encountered rough
treatment. In March 1988, two American employees of the Panama
Canal Commission reported they had been severely beaten and
threatened with shooting by the PDF.15 The use of excessive force in
making arrests and in conducting interrogations was apparently
common.16
The United States raised matters of police mistreatment with the
PDF representatives on the Joint Committee established under the
1977 Panama Canal Treaty.17 But from 1987 forward, the Joint
Committee ceased to function effectively, and the PDF generally did
not respond to complaints or take disciplinary action against the
12. DOD Summary, supra note 7 (incident of Aug. 3, 1988).
13. A U.S. military police liaison accompanying the civilian employee was pushed aside.
The civilian employee was dragged into the station, handcuffed, beaten with a rubber hose, and
kicked in the head and body by a PDF lieutenant and DEN! personnel, suffering a broken
eardrum and extensive bruises. See DOD Summary, supra note 7 (incident of Feb. 5, 1989);
see also PDF Officers Beat Up u.s. Navy Workers, Tropic Times, Feb. 10, 1989, at I, col. 1.
14. Take, for example, the following:
On 3 Sep 88, [soldier's name deleted] and his family were detained in the vicinity of
Rio Sereno Volcan by six armed civilian-clothed individuals. They were transported
to a PDF station where a PDF Lt. Chavez accused them of spying and threatened
their life by stating: "Maybe your country sent you hoping we'd kill you and your
family, or beat you up so they'll have a reason to invade; or for the New York Times
to print 'US soldier and family killed by Panama Defense Forces.' Even if we didn't
do anything to you, you may still go out and have a beer and on your way back,
driving at night, you miss a curve, fall off a cliff and die along with your family."
DOD Summary, supra note 7 (incident of Sept. 3, 1988).
15. Incidents of Harassment Against the Panama Canal Commission and Its Employees
(describing incident of March 23, 1988), Attachment to Testimony of John Maher, Branch
Agent, Panama Canal Pilots Branch, International Organization of the Masters, Mates and
Pilots Union, AFL-CIO, in Harassment ofPanama Canal Employees: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelfof the House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 10lst Cong., 1st Sess. at 86 (May 18, 1989). See also Rohter, Americans Living
in Ex-Canal Zone Complain ofHarassment by Panama, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1988, at A18,
col.!.
16. DOD Summary, supra note 7.
17. Interview with Gen. Fred F. Woerner, U.S. Army (Ret.), in Boston, Massachusetts
(June 1 & 26, 1990) [hereinafter Woerner Interview] (General Woerner was Commander-in-
Chiefof the U.S. Southern Command in Panama until October I, 1989). See Article IV Imple-
menting Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3; see also Agreement Between the United States and
Panama on Joint Committee, Oct. I, 1979, 33 U.S.T. 558, T.I.A.S. 10045 (effected by
Exchange of Notes).
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officers involved.18 After Noriega ousted Panamanian President Eric
Arturo Delvalle in February 1988, the United States declined to rec-
ognize Noriega or his newly-selected president as legitimate represent-
atives of the government of Panama. United States Embassy officials
and the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Southern Com-
mand were under guidance to avoid contacts with the Noriega gov-
ernment. 19 Hence, there were few acceptable channels for effective
remonstrance.
C. Automatic Weapons Fire and Intrusions at Military Bases
The provocations of the Noriega regime also included action
against on-duty U.S. military personnel and military facilities. From
early 1988 until 1989, repeated intrusions occurred at the Arraijan
Tank Farm, the major strategic aviation fuel facility of the United
States Southern Command. Arraijan provides fuel storage for mili-
tary aircraft flying from Howard Air Force Base, a key facility for the
United States' air presence in Central America. In repeated incidents,
automatic weapons fire was directed at United States sentry personnel
and toward buried storage tanks containing millions of gallons of jet
fuepo The weapons fire came from the heavy canopy jungle sur-
rounding the Tank Farm. Early on, American sentries were rein-
18. Joint Briefing, U.S. Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama City (July 25 &
27, 1990) [hereinafter Quarry Heights Briefing]; Woerner Interview, supra note 17; telephone
interview'with Dr. Gabriel Marcella, U.S. Anny War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania (Sept. 11,
1990). One exception involved the disciplining of a PDF lieutenant for the February 5, 1989
beating of a United States Navy civilian employee in the DENI police station.
19. Joint Briefing, U.S. Anny War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania (June 10, 1991); tele-
phone interview with John Bushnell, former Charge d'Affaires, United States Embassy, Pan-
ama (Nov. 13, 1991).
20. Quarry Heights Briefing, supra note 18; Woerner Interview, supra note 17. See
Gordon, u.s. Marine Is Killed in Panama, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1988, at A3, col. 3; Pitt,
Marines Fire on Panama 'Intruders,' N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1988, at A3, col. 1; Gunfire and a
War ofNerves; The United States in Panama: A Troubled Presence, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1988,
at D3, col. 1; American Soldiers in Panama Exchange Fire with Intruders, N.Y. Times, July 21,
1988, at A7, col. 6; Malone, The Panama Debacle-Uncle Sam Wimps Out, Wash. Post, Apr.
23, 1989, at Cl (over 50 attacks at fuel depot).
See also Firefight Erupts at Navy Tank Farm, Tropic Times, Apr. 13, 1988, at 1, col. I
(Marine killed in Apr. 11, 1988 intrusion involving 6-8 persons); RP Blames Nervous Marines
for Firing, Tropic Times, Apr. 15, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (two-hour "firefight" on Apr. 12, 1988
involving 100 U.S. Marines and 40-50 intruders); Tweedale, Tank Farm Intruders "Highly
Professional," Tropic Times, Apr. 18, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (Apr. 12, 1988 intruders used night
vision equipment; "sporadic exchanges" of gunfire); Tweedale, Firefight Casualties Uncon-
firmed, Tropic Times, Apr. 25, 1988, at 1, col. 2 (pentagon unable to confirm or deny that
Cuban commandos were killed or wounded); Marines Fire at Intruders, Tropic Times, Jan. 20,
1989, at 1, col. 3 (two tracer rounds received from tree line in Jan. 15, 1989 intrusion at Tank
Farm); Marines Fire at Intruders on Panama Base, United Press Int'l, Jan. 19, 1989 (shots fired
by intruder at Tank Farm on Jan. 15, 1989).
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forced and returned fire. The weapons fire was apparently designed to
harass; no fuel tanks or American personnel were hit by incoming fire.
The provocation caused an American fatality. On April 11,
1988, United States Marine Corporal Ricardo M. Villahermosa was
killed in the crossfire of American forces responding to an armed
intrusion at the Tank Farm.21 The Tank Farm intruders did not wear
PDF uniforms, yet their connection to the Noriega regime was sug-
gested by reports that they used night vision equipment and that
intruders were wounded and removed to Cuba for medical treat-
ment.22 The former United States Commander in Panama concluded
that Noriega was seeking to taunt American troops, and perhaps to
blow up one of the half-million gallon fuel tanks as a spectacle to
prove the vulnerability of American forces.23
There were also armed intrusions, with shots fired, at the Navy
Ammunition Depot,24 and at a facility of the National Security
Agency.2s In addition, relations between the Panamanian and Ameri-
can forces were dangerously tense at joint military facilities. At Fort
Amador, for example, the PDF dug trenches in front of their bar-
racks, facing American military family housing, and trained a
machine gun on the helicopter of the American Commander-in-Chief
when it took off or landed.26
D. Panama's Declaration ofa State of War
On December 15, 1989, the Panamanian National Assembly
passed a declaration of a "state of war."27 Noriega gave a bellicose
21. Gordon, u.s. Marine is Killed in Panama, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1988, at A3, col. 3.
22. See, e.g., Malone, The Panama Debacle-Uncle Sam Wimps Out, Wash. Post, Apr. 23,
1989, at C1 (some intelligence analysts conclude Cuban commandos led Apr. 13, 1988 raid,
with three Cubans wounded, two evacuated to Cuban vessel transiting the Canal).
23. Woemer Interview, supra note 17.
24. Guards See More Intruders in u.s. Areas, Tropic Times, Apr. 22, 1988, at 1, col. 1
(intruders at ammunition storage depot fire at U.s. sentry); Marines Fire at Intruders, Tropic
Times, Jan. 20, 1989, at 1, col. 3 (intruder "believed to be armed" seen at ammunition depot).
25. Quarry Heights Briefing, supra note 18.
26. Id.
27. The Spanish text of the December 15 National Assembly resolution (Resolucion No.
10), as published in Gaceta Oficial, No. 21,436, stated in part:
Que la Republica de Panama, pais pacifico, tradicionalmente dedicado al trabajo
laborioso para lograr un desarrollo armonico de su poblacion, ha estado durante los
dos uItimos aiios bajo un cruel y constante hostigamiento por parte del Gobiemo de
los Estados Unidos de America, cuyo Presidente ha hecho uso de los poderes de
guerra que jamas su nacion ejercio contra ningt1no de sus mas encamizados enemigos
en las guerras que ha sostenido en distintos continentes, para tratar de someter la
voluntad de los panameiios.
* * * *
RESUELVE:
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speech seeking the declaration and additional powers as head of gov-
ernment.28 The declaration of a state of war certainly deserves weight
as evidence of a foreign adversary's possible intention to use armed
force. Even if one assumes the declaration was primarily aimed at
enhancing Noriega's governmental powers-by creating a domestic
"state of war" more akin to a state of emergency-the difference
might be missed by members of the PDF and by members of
Noriega's civilian militia, the "Dignity Battalions," thus creating real
danger to U.S. personnel. Administration officials have indicated
. that, despite initial White House public statements dismissing the
state of war declaration as a "hollow step" unworthy of immediate
Presidential attention,29 the declaration of a state of war became a
matter of concern in the White House.
1. Se dec1ara a la Republica de Panama en estado de guerra, mientras dure la agre-
sion desatada contra e1 pueblo panamefio por e1 gobierno de los Estados Unidos de
America.
A translation circulated within the United States government read as follows:
That for the past 2 years the Republic of Panama, a peaceful country tradition-
ally dedicated to hard work to achieve the harmonious development of its popula-
tion, has been under the cruel and constant harassment of the U.S. Government
whose President has used the power ofwar to try and subject the will of the Panama-
nian people, a power his nation never exercised against its worst enemies during the
wars it has fought on the various continents.
• • • •
It is resolved:
1. To declare the Republic of Panama in a state of war for the duration of the
aggression unleashed against the Panamanian people by the U.S. Government.
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Information Service LAT-89-241 (Dec. 18, 1989)
at 19, 20.
28. The phrases in Noriega's speech to the Panamanian National Assembly generally
regarded as most threatening are within the following passage:
The only thing that the U.S. empire will not be able to steal from us is our geographi-
cal position as bridge of the world and heart of the universe across which all world
flags must transit. We would not use the canal as an ideological or personal tool to
favor conflicting interests. We do not justify the excessive U.S. military fighting
strength under the sophism of defending the canal from being destroyed. We, the
Panamanians, are the sole and ultimate canal custodians. They should not fool
themselves and confuse the world because even before [former Southern Command
commander] General Galvin was here, the last few professional regional com-
manders had confirmed that the United States cannot defend the canal even if a
soldier were posted along every single meter of the interoceanic waterway[.]
We, the Panamanians, will sit along the banks of the canal to watch the dead
bodies ofour enemies pass by, but we would never destroy the canal.
Speech of General Noriega before the Assembly, Panama City Radio and Television Services
(in Spanish), 1846 Greenwich Mean Time, Dec. 15, 1989, translation by U.S. Dept. of Com-
merce, Foreign Broadcast Information Service LAT-89-24l (Dec. 18, 1989) at 21,24 (empha-
sis added).
29. Panama Assembly Names Noriega Government Chief, L.A. Times, Dec. 16, 1989, at
A4, col. 1 ("White House officials regarded the announcement from Panama as so insignificant
that they did not immediately inform President Bush after he left the Oval Office early, suffer-
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E. The Lieutenant Paz Shooting
On December 16, 1989, Marine Lieutenant Robert paz was
fatally shot as he rode in a car through a roadblock in front of PDP
Headquarters. This was taken by the United States to be an escala-
tion of the violence, and was the immediate trigger of the invasion.30
On Saturday evening at about nine o'clock, the car with four off-duty
American military officers drove up to a roadblock next to La
Comandancia, the PDP Military Headquarters, in the low-income El
Chorrillo section of Panama City. PDP personnel at the roadblock
pointed weapons at the officers and tried roughly to remove them
from the car. The American Marine captain at the wheel sped the
engine and raced the car away from the roadblock. The PDP road-
block guards fired, and a bullet killed Marine Lieutenant Robert Paz,
a passenger in the back seat.31 The driver of the car, Captain Mark
Haddad, was grazed by a shot. Shortly before, an American Navy
Lieutenant and his wife had been stopped at the same roadblock and,
after witnessing the Paz shooting, they were taken to a PDP police
station, where the Navy Lieutenant was severely beaten and his wife
threatened with sexual abuse during a PDP interrogation.32 Upon
their return to the Southern Command, the three surviving members
of the Paz car and the Navy Lieutenant and his wife were debriefed
overnight by American authorities. The events were immediately
reported to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The decision to
invade Panama was apparently made on Sunday, December 17. A
recommendation from General Maxwell Thurman, the Commander-
in-Chief of the United States Southern Command, went forward to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Sunday morning, and an "order to exe-
cute" was approved by the President on Sunday afternoon.33
No American had before been killed by uniformed PDP forces.
The shooting came the day after Panama's state of war declaration on
December 15, 1989; the order of events could be taken as evidence
that Noriega's bellicose rhetoric had loosened any sense of restraint
ing from a raspy voice."); Opposition Leader in Panama Rejects a Peace Offer from Noriega,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1989, at AS, col. 1 (Marlin Fitzwater said the Assembly action was
"another hollow step in [Noriega's] attempt to force his rule on the Panamanian people.").
30. See PRESIDENT'S LETTER, supra note 1.
31. U.S. Southern Command, News Release Nos. 89-12-6, 89-12-8; PDF Kz1ls
SOUTHCOM Officer, Tropic Times, Dec. 18, 1989, at 1, col. 1. The American car proceeded
to Gorgas Hospital, where Lieutenant Paz was pronounced dead. Id.
32. U.S. Southern Command, News Release No. 89-12-7; PDF Kills SOUTHCOM
Officer, Tropic Times, Dec. 18, 1989, col. 1.
33. Quarry Heights Briefing, supra note 18; see also Defense Department Briefing by
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin
Powell, Fed. News Serv., Dec. 20, 1989.
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on the part of the PDF in their treatment of Americans. Noriega did
not issue an apology after the Paz shooting. Instead, Panamanian
officials alleged that the Americans had been the aggressors in the
incident, firing at the PDF Headquarters and local bystanders as they
drove by several roadblocks.34 By failing to admit and condemn the
shots fired by the PDF at the American car, Noriega ratified the kill-
ing of Lieutenant Paz. If decisive action was not taken after the Paz
killing, one may argue, such incidents would proliferate.
F. The Necessity for Massive Force, or None at All
The most difficult step in the argument for self-defense is to show
why an armed invasion was necessary to counter the problem of PDF
abuse. The key must be the lack of a safe haven; the American mili-
tary and civilian population would remain vulnerable to retaliation if
any lesser use of defensive force were attempted. Though most vio-
lence against Americans was uncontrolled hooliganism by the PDF,
rather than the execution of orders from Noriega, the constant, dif-
fuse quality of the violence might still argue for the broad use of force:
one needed to intimidate the PDF and Dignity Battalions generally in
order to stop anti-American abuse.
G. In Sum
These hard facts-no ready haven for Americans in Panama, a
pattern of harassment and violence against American personnel and
facilities, made more alarming by Noriega's declaration of war and
the Paz shooting-and the calculation that any intermediate use of
force could expose Americans to retaliation are the heart of the justifi-
cation for the American invasion in self-defense.3s
34. See Comunicado. Fuerzas de Deftnsa. Republica de Panama (Dec. 17, 1989), printed
in Critica, El Diario del Pueblo (panama City), Dec. 18, 1989, at 1, col. 3 ("Siendo aprox-
imadamente las 9:00 de la noche del sabado, un vehlculo con matricula norteamericana
irrumpio a gran velocidad los retenes ubicados en la Avenida A y Calles 21, 23, 25 Yel limite,
haciendo disparos contra el Cuartel Central y la poblacion civil de El Chorrillo, dejando como
saldo de heridos de bala a la nefiita de un ano, Elin Bethancourt, al senor Ruperto Ales Gaile y
al soldado Alex Correa, de nuestra instituci6n.") (Translation: At approximately nine o'clock
on Saturday night, a vehicle with a North American license plate broke through at great veloc-
ity the roadblocks at Avenue A and streets 21, 23, 25, shooting at the Central Headquarters
and the civil population ofEI Chorrillo, leaving wounded a one-year old girl Elin Bethancourt,
Mr. Ruperto Ales Gaile and soldier Alex Correa, of our institution.).
35. As in any incident, there may be undisclosed intelligence information to supplement
the proponent's case. However, the precedential meaning of an incident is necessarily drawn,
in the public discourse of international law, from the facts that are publicly available.
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II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST SELF-DEFENSE
A skeptic could admit these facts and still pose hard questions.
The use of force is limited in the late twentieth century by the stan-
dards of the United Nations Charter and by the customary law rules
of necessity and proportionality. These standards raise difficulties for
the theory of self-defense in justifying the Panama invasion.
A. No Classical Armed Attack
The rule of self-defense recognized by the United Nations Char-
ter allows the use of force against an "armed attack."36 But the his-
tory of provocation and abuse of American personnel in Panama does
not fit any classical idea of an armed attack. The dual function of the
PDF as a police agency and a military force cannot disguise that the
problem faced by American servicemen and civilians was largely one
of police brutality. The incidents of harassing weapons fire at the
Arraijan Tank Farm certainly qualify as illegal violence, but they
involved guerrilla personnel whose identity was never publicly
asserted by the United States, and the incidents had largely abated
long before the invasion.37
Does the December 15 declaration by the Panamanian National
Assembly substitute for an armed attack? At least one senior member
of the State Department Office of the Legal Adviser took the view
that a declaration of a state of war was not an adequate predicate for
the use of force, unless there was reason to believe that violence would
ensue.38 The text of article 51 of the U.N. Charter39 recognizes a
right of self-defense in the case of armed attack, but extends no simi-
lar recognition to a formal declaration of a state of war or a state of
emergency. Anticipatory defense against a future attack may sensibly
be allowed when an adversary's threat of force is "instant, over-
whelming, and leav[es] no choice of means ...."40 But in Panama,
36. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence ifan armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security.").
37. Woerner Interview, supra note 17.
38. Briefing, Legal Adviser's Office, United States Department of State, Washington,
D.C. (July 17, 1990).
39. See supra note 36.
40. This is the classical formulation by Secretary of State Daniel Webster. See Letter
from Secretary of State Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842) (the "Caroline" case), in I
THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS 669 (K. Shewmaker ed. 1983), also
in 2 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906). In a world of nuclear danger, we
may wish to permit anticipatory self-defense against overwhelming threats to national safety,
even where the threat is not immediate. But the threat in Panama did not approach any such
level of danger to national safety and survival.
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the threat was not of any instant or overwhelming force, rather of
exacerbated harassment.41 The import of the December 15 declara-
tion must be judged against the events of the summer and fall of 1989.
Noriega and his officials had used similar martial rhetoric on many
prior occasions,42 especially following the United States' vigorous mil-
itary exercises in Panama over the summer of 1989.43 The December
15 declaration was made while Noriega was seeking additional
domestic powers, including the designation of Head of State previ-
ously enjoyed by General Omar Torrijos.44 The weight now given to
the declaration differs from the United States' initial skeptical
41. In the author's interviews with numerous officials of the United States government,
no one has suggested that Noriega had any plan to initiate an overall attack on American
facilities, personnel, or civilians. The paper record of incidents seems to corroborate that Pan-
amanian police used excessive force on many occasions in dealing with American personnel.
Americans living in Panama readily confirm that these incidents demoralized the American
community. But early on, the U.S. Southern Command gave a low key account of the
incidents:
"[T]his harassment pattern is not considered a campaign orchestrated by the Gen.
Manuel A. Noriega regime, ... but rather a continuation of a trend which began in
February," a US SOUTHCOM official reported.... The officials pointed out that
incidents, such as numerous unwarranted detentions, use of excessive force, beatings
and sexual harassment, are more likely actions of PDF personnel who are taking
advantage of Noriega's anti-U.S. posture, encouraged by the regime-directed dis-
information campaign aiming to besmirch U.S. forces and policy in Panama. ... US
SOUTHCOM officials say that ... most harassments have not been life-threatening,
[but] they do pose quality of life limitations on U.S. military personnel in Panama.
Tropic Times, Aug. 26, 1988, at I, col. 1.
42. See, e.g., Noriega Breaks Silence, Hits Us. "Imperialism," Tropic Times, May 19,
1989, at 7, col. 1 (Noriega stated "our country has been the object of aggression for the last 18
months. The point of confrontation is precisely between Panama and the [U.S.] military pres-
ence in our area.").
43. The U.S. operations, called "Purple Storms" and "Sand Fleas," were announced as
an exercise of treaty rights under the 1977 Treaty. Panama argued the United States did not
have a right to conduct exercises of such broad scope, and castigated the exercises as a mock
invasion. See Letter of Noriega Regime's Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Leonardo Kam to President of the Security Council (Aug. 8, 1989), U.N. Doc. S/20773
("United States troops in Panamanian territory have continued the dangerous escalation of
their acts of intimidation, provocation and aggression against Panama, in violation of its sover-
eignty and territorial integrity and of the Panama Canal Treaties."), quoted in Panama Asks
for Second UN. Meeting, Tropic Times, Aug. 9, 1989, at 1, col. 1; Remarks of Panamanian
Foreign Minister Jorge Ritter, 44 U.N. SCOR (2874th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/PV.2874, at 18, 23
(1989) (U.S. forces claim right to "move without restrictions of any kind throughout Panama-
nian territory" as if "an army of occupation .... Panama has almost become a theater of
war."), quoted in R.P. "Almost a Theater of War" RitterAccuses, Tropic Times, Aug. 14, 1989,
at 8, col. 1 (with slight textual variations). See also Panama Seeks UN Help Against Us.,
Tropic Times, Aug. 30, 1989, at 5, col. 3 (Foreign Minister Jorge Ritter "said Panama had
already been invaded by U.S. forces, who had taken over villages, hospitals and law courts
during the exercises.").
44. See Panama National Assembly, Resolucion No. 10 (Dec. 15, 1989), Gaceta Oficial,
No. 21,436; also in U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Information Service LAT-89-
241 (Dec. 18, 1989) at 19.
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response: U.S. forces in Panama were not put on alert after the Pana-
manian National Assembly's declaration, nor were personnel move-
ments 1imited.45 No special advisory was issued by the American
Embassy or Southern Command to American civilians living in Pan-
ama concerning the National Assembly's state of war declaration.
The White House publicly dismissed the event as a "hollow step."46
The prior commander of American forces concludes that the state of
war declaration was a "description of a condition that had existed. It
did not imply a change of attitude."47
We should be reluctant to craft a rule impeding the United States
from responding to persistent mistreatment of its nationals abroad.
Governments exist to protect their citizens. At the same time, how-
ever, in judging whether it is permissible to invade another country,
one should not lose sight of the difference between low-level harass-
ment and large-scale armed attacks that threaten territorial rights or
numerous lives.
B. The Duty to Employ Less Drastic Means
The use of force requires a showing of necessity and proportion-
ality.48 These standards govern the right to resort to war, not only
tactics in war. As a result of the invasion of Panama, though the
battle plan was carefully conducted, several ·hundred Panamanian
civilians were killed,49 three thousand Panamanian civilians were
45. According to a Southern Command spokesman, before and after the declaration of
the state of war, American troops in Panama "were at 'Charlie' [an intermediate personnel
movement limitation]. because rhetoric was not uncommon. It was not the kind of thing you
would shut down for." Under condition "Charlie," soldiers could go out to restaurants in
downtown Panama City, though they were required to avoid bars and discos. Personnel move-
ment limitations had been at "Charlie" during most of the three months prior to the state of
war declaration. Quarry Heights Briefing, supra note 18. See also Opposition Leader in Pan-
ama Rejects a Peace Offer from Noriega, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1989, at AS, col. 1 ("Marlin
Fitzwater, the White House spokesman, also said American troops in Panama . . . had not
changed their alert status because of the declaration.").
46. Opposition Leader in Panama Rejects a Peace Offer from Noriega, N.Y. Times, Dec.
17, 1989, at AS, col. 1 (White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater called the declaration
"another hollow step in an attempt to force his [Noriega's] rule on the Panamanian people.").
47. Woerner Interview, supra note 17.
48. These requirements serve "the over-riding policy . . . of minimizing coercion and
violence across state lines." McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57
AM. J. !NT'L L. 597, 600-01 (1963). See D. BOWEIT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 93-94 (1958); I. BROWNLIE,INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
259,261,279 & n.2 (1963); Y. DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 190-91,
216·21 (1988).
49. The initial estimate by U.S. authorities was 202 Panamanian civilians dead. A medi-
cal mission to Panama conducted by Dr. Jane Schaller, Chair ofTufts Medical School Depart-
ment of Pediatrics, Dr. Paul Wise of Harvard Medical School, and Dr. Gregg Bloche of
Georgetown University, on behalf of Physicians for Human Rights, concluded that the initial
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wounded, and approximately 18,000 Panamanians lost their homes.50
Before mounting an invasion to avoid future incidents of police bru-
tality and harassment, it behooves any government to show that other
available means to guard its citizens from danger have been
employed. On this count, the United States remains vulnerable.51
Possible protective measures not taken by the United States included:
(1) moving all armed services personnel and dependents onto base
areas at an early date; (2) restricting movements of United States mili-
tary personnel outside base areas except for the performance ofofficial
duties; (3) allowing personnel to carry sidearms when travelling
outside American bases; (4) providing armed patrols of Canal Com-
mission housing areas; and (5) withdrawing vulnerable American
civilians from Panama during the crisis. In addition, the United
States could have taken steps after the shooting of Lieutenant Paz to
clarify responsibility and to make clear to Noriega that any additional
violence would prompt retaliation.
1. Providing Physical Protection On and Outside Base Areas
Although the Canal Zone no longer exists as a separate enclave,
the United States has numerous military bases along the Canal.
Many of the bases are designated as "defense sites," and the United
States is entitled under the Treaty to maintain exclusive access to
these areas.52 American troops could have been housed-safely and
mortality estimate omitted at least 100 additional civilian deaths. See Statement of Physicians
for Human Rights (Somerville, Mass., Mar. 15, 1990). Roberto Eisenman, publisher of La
Prensa, who was exiled by Noriega, estimates approximately 500 civilian deaths. Interview
with Roberto Eisenman in Panama City (July 26, 1990). In July 1990, officials of the United
States Southern Command stated there was no complete list of Panamanian civilian casualties,
and that no list was being prepared. Quarry Heights Briefing, supra note 18. See also Hock-
stader, In Panama, Civilian Deaths Remain an Issue, Wash. Post, Oct. 6, 1990, at A23, col. 1.
No payment has been made to the families of civilian casualties on an ex gratia or other
basis.
50. This estimate was made by the head of the Panamanian relief effort, Teresita de
Arias. See Statement of Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 49, at 11. Other estimates
of the number ofhomeless ranged from 2,500 to 20,000. See Hollinan, Bush Unveils $1 Billion
Panama Aid Package; President Calls Aid Loan Plan Close to "Instant Relief" For Homeless,
Wash. Post, Jan. 26, 1990, at A8, col. 4; A Year Later, Many in Panama Remain Homeless,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1990, at A3, col. 1; Eisner, United States v. Noriega, Newsday, Jan. 6,
1990, at 12.
51. Even observers who support the invasion have suggested other means of protecting
U.S. armed services personnel and U.S. civilians may have been available. Columnist George
Will noted, "American lives and assets might have been protectable by measures short ofinter-
vention." Will, Good Neighbor Policy, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1989, at A29, col. 1.
52. Under the Panama Canal Treaty, the United States is entitled to exclusive use of
"defense sites" for treaty purposes until the year 2000. These defense sites include Howard
Air Force Base, Rodman U.S. Naval Station, Fort Clayton-Corozal Army Reservation,
Albrook Air Force Station, Fort William Davis Military Reservation and Fort Sherman. In
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securely from PDF harassment--on the defense sites. This measure
would have imposed hardship conditions, but would have protected
American personnel from PDF police encounters. Prefabricated
housing could have been constructed on exclusive-access American
defense sites to accommodate essential personnel.
American military personnel could also have been afforded pro-
tection when travelling outside the base areas. Commanders, with
appropriate clearance from Washington, could have authorized
United States personnel to carry sidearms at all times outside military
compounds and issued locater radios to allow immediate back-up.53
Although the agreements implementing the 1977 Panama Canal
Treaty restrict the carrying of arms while off-duty,54 United States
personnel might do so with justification in light of Noriega's policy of
harassing American soldiers which was wholly inconsistent with the
Panama Canal Treaty.55 A signatory to a treaty is permitted to
engage in reasonable measures to protect against the other signatory's
defalcation.56 Carrying sidearms outside the military bases would
have been an intermediate measure of self-defense that challenged the
treaty regime far less drastically than a full-scale invasion. Alterna-
tively, American soldiers could have been restricted to base except for
official duties. When travelling on duty, American servicemen were
entitled to carry weapons under the Treaty57 and could be detailed in
addition, the United States occupies "military areas of coordination" which are set aside for
"coordinated use" by the armed forces of both governments. "Military areas of coordination"
include Quarry Heights, Fort Amador, and Fort Gulick, as well as housing areas in Curundu
Heights, Herrick Heights, and Coco Solo South. See Article IV Implementing Agreement,
supra note 2, arts. 1 & 4, annex A. In military areas of coordination, the senior United States
Commander has treaty "responsibility for interior security, including control ofaccess to these
Areas," with military police patrols to be jointly conducted. Id., annex B.
53. Where an American was detained, "[w]e should have responded with several MP's
going down immediately rather than 12 hours later with an unarmed Spec. 4," noted one
official. Joint Briefing, U.S. Army War College, supra note 19.
54. Article IV Implementing Agreement, supra note 2, art. 21, allows United States ser-
vice personnel to carry "official arms ... [w]hen required by their official duties," under stan-
dards established by the Joint Committee. The possession and carrying of private firearms was
to be governed by Panamanian law and U.S. Forces regulations. Yet, if service personnel are
targeted for harassment because of their status, one might legitimately choose to take a broader
notion of the requirements of official duties.
55. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. AlConf. 39/27, art. 26,
reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L. L. 875, and 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), (concluded at Vienna, May 23,
1969, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980; U.S. not a party, but treaty generally restates customary
law) ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith.").
56. Id. art. 60(1) ("A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles
the other to invoke the breach as a ground for . . . suspending its operation in whole or in
part.").
57. See Article IV Implementing Agreement, supra note 2.
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groups. The U.S. Southern Command could have safeguarded Canal
Commission employees and essential contractors by housing them on
military bases, providing military escorts for essential outside activi-
ties, and controlling access to Canal Commission housing areas.
2. Withdrawing Vulnerable American Civilians
The major reason proffered by American commanders for not
using intermediate counter-measures to deter Noriega and the PDF
was the vulnerability of the American civilian population.58 Yet
inconvenient steps to reduce the exposure of American civilians were
not pursued even at the latest stage in the confrontation with Noriega.
The American business community was never asked by the Presi-
dent to withdraw personnel from Panama or to reduce their num-
bers.59 While American Presidents shoulder a responsibility to
protect the safety of American business people abroad, there is a dif-
ference between using force to provide protection during the evacua-
tion of American civilians, and using force to guarantee their safe
residence abroad into the indefinite future. Whether we like it or not,
international law does not entitle one country to displace another
country's existing government in order to provide a secure, long-term
environment for nationals who have chosen to live or do business
abroad. Armed force may be used to protect American corporate per-
sonnel and other civilians during their evacuation,60 but it is another
matter to use armed force to guarantee a Pax Mercatoria. 61
58. Woerner Interview, supra note 17; Quarry Heights Briefing, supra note 18.
59. A President could have sought the voluntary cooperation of the American corporate
community, or, in the alternative, issued an Executive Order under the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act limiting the expenditure of American funds in Panama. See
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701-06 (1988).
60. In April 1988, the u.s. Embassy briefed the American business community on pro-
cedures for evacuation of up to 35,000 civilians from Panama in the event of an emergency.
The evacuation was designed to proceed through u.s. military bases. See Tweedle, Noriega
Blames Scared Marines For Mystery Firefights, United Press Int'l, Apr. 14, 1988 (evacuation
plan for civilians). See also Larmer, In Canal Zone, American Concerns Grow, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Mar. 29, 1988, at 1, col. 2 (evacuation plan for Canal Commission employees and
dependents); Rohter, Charm Fades/or Americans Living in Canal Zone, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13,
1988, at A16, col. 3.
61. Even if a treaty allows civilians to remain in a foreign country for purposes of trade
or convenience, we are unlikely to say that all treaty rights can be vindicated at the cost of
using force. Canal Commission employees, and Canal and armed services contractors, were
entitled to live in Panama to assist in Canal operations and military activities, and we may
want to distinguish this as a national security interest. See Article III Implementing Agree-
ment, supra note 6, arts. 11 & 12; Article IV Implementing Agreement, supra note 2, art. 12.
These civilians were relatively few in number and could have been sheltered on defense sites
and controlled-access housing areas,
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As for military dependents, plans to remove military families
were pursued belatedly and incompletely. The Department of
Defense withdrew some military dependent families in May 1988.62
"Operation Blade Jewel" began in May 1989 to transfer remaining
military families to housing on military bases and adjacent Canal
Commission housing areas, or to return them to the United States.63
But logistical arrangements were never made to allow these families
to live self-sufficiently on the base areas, and the delay in evacuating
dependents prolonged their vulnerability and allowed incidents to
accumulate. In an all-volunteer army, it is difficult to separate service
personnel from their families for long tours, or to require family resi-
dence in makeshift housing.64 But under international law, inconven-
ience must be incurred before one can resort to lethal force.6s
The critic of the invasion may still be asked: Why was there any
duty to regroup in more secure areas? If the Panama Canal Treaty
guaranteed American dependents the right to live anywhere in Pan-
ama, was there any duty to reside on defense sites rather than stand
our ground in the vulnerable areas? There are two responses. First,
the Panama Canal Treaty is notably vague. It recognizes categories of
"defense sites" for exclusive American military use and "areas of
coordination" for joint use,66 but does not set forth any unrestricted
right of residency throughout the Republic of Panama for military
personnel and their dependents. Second, even if the Treaty is taken to
create an implied right of unrestricted residency, this part of the
Treaty was not essential to American national security interests; we
should shrink from any proposed doctrine that allows any and all
treaty rights to be vindicated by force, for we may see a proliferation
of excuses for war in the hands of other countries. The alternative of
62. See Service Members, Civilians End Move From RP, Tropic Times, July 7, 1989, at 1,
col. 1 (describing May 1988 program to curtail travel to Panama of dependents accompanying
military "sponsors," and voluntary early return to U.S. of dependents already living in Pan-
ama); Sciolino, u.s. Says Panama is Harassing G.L 's, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1988, at A16, col.
1 (1400 of2450 families ofmilitary personnel and Department ofDefense civilians sent back to
United States or to safer locations in Panama).
63. See Service Members, Civilians End Move From RP, Tropic Times, July 7, 1989, at 1,
col. 1 (in two month period, 6300 military personnel, Department of Defense civilians, and
dependents relocated from Panama City to housing on U.S. military bases, to Panama Canal
Commission housing areas, or to U.S.).
64. A standard unaccompanied tour of duty is 12-15 months long, under DOD policy.
The Southern Command wished to have personnel "versed in the area," requiring longer tours.
Quarry Heights Briefing, supra note 18.
65. See, e.g., Y. DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 216 ("Necessity comes to the fore when war
is begun following an isolated armed attack.").
66. See Panama Canal Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 1 & 4, annex A.
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providing protected residence on base areas was the course most
clearly consistent with the U.N. Charter in the Panama crisis.
3. Fully Investigating the Paz Shooting and Communicating U.S.
Concern to Noriega
The shooting of Lieutenant Paz on December 16, 1989 was the
first death of a U.S. citizen publicly attributed to the PDF.67 White
House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater called it an act of "murder."68
But one may ask why the United States was unable to allow any inter-
val for investigation of the incident before making a decision to invade
Panama, and why the United States did not take steps to clarify
responsibility for the incident with Noriega. To be sure, the Lieuten-
ant Paz shooting was made more likely by the heightened tension
between the United States and Panama. The shooting arguably
stemmed·from provocation by the Panamanians. PDF members at
the roadblock in front of PDF military headquarters pointed their
weapons at the American officers and tried to pull the officers from
the car, without taking the intermediate step ofchecking their identifi-
cation cards or inquiring why they were present in front of La
Comandancia.
But American officials acknowledge that Panama had the right
to establish traffic roadblocks in Panama City.69 Fleeing from a road-
block may have triggered a reflexive, violent response from roadblock
guards. The United States soldiers in the car drove through the
checkpoint directly in front of a sensitive Panamanian military facility
where Noriega's own office was located, in an atmosphere still tense
from the October coup attempt. The Panama City Modelo jail also
was nearby, where a U.S. citizen accused of involvement in an intelli-
gence operation was widely known to be incarcerated; the proximity
of the jail may have added to the Panamanians' excessive response. It
is also conceivable that the shots fired at the fleeing car may have been
intended only to disable the vehicle.70
In relying upon the incident as predicate for the invasion, the
United States also faces the question of whether the acts of low-level
67. One American serviceman was killed in defensive crossfire at the Arraijan Tank
Farm in 1988, but the United States Government did not publicly claim the intruders were
associated with the PDF.
68. White House Briefing by Marlin Fitzwater (Fed. News Serv., Dec. 18, 1989). See
also U.S. Southern Command, News Release No. 89-12-7, at p. 3.
69. Quarry Heights Briefing, supra note 18.
70. Under the Endara government, shots fired by a Panamanian officer at a fleeing car
have again caused the death of a U.S. serviceman. Panama Police Kill u.s. Soldier, United
Press Int'l, Nov. 5, 1991; Tensions Rise Between Police, u.s. Soldiers, United Press Int'l, Nov.
8, 1991; u.s. Envoy Says "Excessive Force" Used in Soldier's Death, Reuters, Nov. 6, 1991.
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officers should have been attributed to the Panamanian government,
and whether any other remedy was available. A former American
commander has noted that Noriega sought to taunt our forces in Pan-
ama, but that Noriega was also wary that any killing could precipitate
American use of force.71 Once President Delvalle was ousted, the
United States declined direct diplomatic contact with Noriega, to
avoid lending support to his regime. Treaty matters were handled
through the structure of the Treaty Affairs Joint Committee of PDF
and American officers. Protest of the shooting of Lieutenant Paz was
made at 11:45 p.m. on December 16 to the Panamanian members of
the Joint Committee.72 According to Southern Command officials,
even in a situation so serious, no attempt was ever made to reach
Noriega for discussion.
Former U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer
has argued that the differing account of the Paz shooting released by
the Panamanian government on Sunday, December 17, was a suffi-
cient indication of Noriega's obduracyY The skeptic may ask why
we could not have contacted Noriega and demanded that he investi-
gate the shooting, immediately suspend the responsible officers, and
issue immediate orders to PDF and Dignity Battalion members to
respect American lives and safety. One could even have brought the
matter to the U.N. Security Council, to which Charter signatories are
textually required to refer disputes that threaten the peace, short of an
Article 51 "armed attack."74
Similarly, the United States' public response after the shooting
may not have communicated how gravely the matter was regarded.
Southern Command officials called the shooting "an isolated inci-
dent."7s This was done, some U.S. officials report, to lull Noriega so
71. Woerner Interview, supra note 17. The brutal mistreatment of an American Navy
Lieutenant and his wife after the paz shooting may have reflected in part the Panamanian
officers' realization that a line had been crossed with the shooting, and their fear of what the
witnesses had seen. It is not clear whether the PDF interrogators knew of Lieutenant Paz's
fatal wound at the time of the interrogation.
72. Fact Sheet on Recap of Recent PDF-US Forces Treaty Violationsllncidents, 11 Jan-
uary 1990, in DEPT. OF DEFENSE, Summary of Pre-Operation Just Cause Incidents (released
Nov. 1, 1990), at 4.
73. Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in Panama, 29 COLUM. J. TRANs-
NAT'L L. 281, 285 (1991). The Panamanian government's news release on Sunday, December
17, 1989, claimed that shots had been fired at La Comandancia by the U.S. servicemen.
74. U.N. CHARTER arts. 33, 37.
75. See United Press Int'l, Dec. 17, 1989 ("Col. Ron Sconyers, a spokesman for the U.S.
Southern Command in Panama, agreed on Cable News Network that 'most of the indications
point that this is an isolated incident, but certainly a very tragic and needless one.' "); see also
id. ("In the aftermath of the Saturday night shooting, an administration official cautioned: 'I
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that he would be vulnerable to a surprise attack 72 hours later.76 But
the skeptic may ask how far a preference for tactical surprise can
qualify the duty of U.N. Charter signatories to seek nonviolent resolu-
tion of disputes.
III. CONCLUSION
This essay is intended as an invitation to debate. The United
States' leadership role in the world includes profound influence as a
lawmaker-in the formation of the customary law of force and the
working law of the Charter. The law that will be drawn from our
action in Panama depends upon what happened in fact. Truncated
official explanations after the event may not fully reflect the circum-
stances that internally were seen as warranting the use of force;
explaining the landscape of the decision may modify the precedential
meaning of the action. Law is also formed by the opiniojuris of states-
men, scholars, and, in a democracy, citizens. We must assess our
decisions in foreign policy in the harsh light of the facts, including
alternative courses of action that were not pursued, to assure United
States actions are consistent with the law we ask others to live by.
think this was an isolated incident. To draw conclusions from the rhetoric of the last few days
would be misleading at this time.' "), reprinted in Tropic Times, Dec. 18, 1989, at 8, col. 2.
The Southern Command press release spoke of the Comandancia shooting as proof of an
atmosphere of recklessness, but did not claim it was desired or planned by the regime. The
shooting showed "a total breakdown of discipline and control within the regime" and "the
critical loss of control by regime leadership." U.S. Southern Command, News Release No. 89-
12-7, at 3. See also Statement ofSecretary ofDefense Richard Cheney, quoted in Tropic Times,
Dec. 18, 1989, at 1, col. 4 ("The lack of discipline and control in the Panamanian Defense
Forces is further evidence that Panama is a country without a government."); Tropic Times,
Dec. 18, 1989, at 1, col. 4 ("Southern Command and U.S. Embassy officials expressed grave
concern over the unwarranted use of deadly force by the PDF.").
76. Quarry Heights Briefing, supra note 18.
